What is AI and agent security testing?
AI and agent security testing checks whether attackers can trick your AI into leaking data or taking actions it should not.
We test ChatGPT, Copilot and Claude with their integrations, your own agents and the AI in your product.
A shared document makes the AI assistant forward customer data
- Impact
- Anyone who shares a document can quietly give the assistant instructions.
- Fix first
- Limit what the assistant may send and require confirmation for actions.
What do we test in an AI Agent Security Assessment?
We do not test whether your AI gives good answers. We test which data, APIs and actions an attacker can reach through your AI: prompt injection, MCP connections and tools, access to SharePoint, Drive or CRM, excessive agent permissions and secrets. It is an extension of application, API and identity testing.
Every finding is validated manually, with a report and a retest after remediation.
Which internal AI agents do we test?
Most companies now run AI assistants that read mail, files and CRM data on behalf of their staff. We do not attack OpenAI, Anthropic or Microsoft. We test your setup: what is connected, what the assistant can read or do, and what an attacker can make it do with one poisoned document or email.
ChatGPT Enterprise and custom GPTs
Connectors to Drive, SharePoint and mail, custom GPTs with actions that call your APIs, and agent mode acting in a browser. We test what an injected file or web page can make ChatGPT read, send or change.
Claude, Claude Code and MCP
Claude with connectors and projects, Claude Code on developer laptops, and the MCP servers that give it access to repositories, tickets and databases. We test tool permissions, stored tokens and commands an agent can be talked into running.
Microsoft 365 Copilot and Copilot Studio
Copilot shows a user everything that user can already open. Oversharing in SharePoint, OneDrive or Teams turns into a data leak within minutes. We test that exposure and the Copilot Studio agents you build, with their own connectors and triggers.
Agents inside business apps
AI agents in your CRM, service desk or HR tool, such as Salesforce Agentforce or ServiceNow. They act with system rights on customer and employee data. We test whether they stay within the rights of the user who asks.
Workflow agents in n8n, Make and Zapier
Automations that react to incoming mail or webhooks and hold stored credentials. An attacker who controls the input often controls the flow. We test that path end to end.
Agent identities and permissions
Every agent runs on API keys, tokens or a service account. We map which identities your agents use, what they can reach and who approves their actions, then test whether least privilege holds under attack.
AI Code Security Review: is the code your AI wrote safe?
Developers now ship code written by Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and Cursor. That code usually works, but it often trusts the user too much, skips authorization checks or puts secrets where they do not belong. The coding agents themselves also have access to your repositories, terminals and pipelines. We review both.
Manual review of AI-written code
An ethical hacker reads the code where it matters: login, authorization, input handling, secrets and business logic. We look for the mistakes AI tools make again and again, not for style issues.
Your AI coding tools
We review how Claude Code, Codex, Copilot and Cursor are set up: which repositories, commands and secrets they can reach, which MCP servers and plugins they load, and what they may run without asking.
Agents in your pipeline
AI agents that open pull requests, fix issues or run in CI often hold write tokens. We test whether a poisoned issue, README or dependency can make them push code you never approved.
Findings you can fix
Every finding is validated by hand, with the file, the line and a fix you can paste back into your coding tool. The retest is included.
What is the testing scope?
How do we test against the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications?
OWASP published this list in December 2025. It is quickly becoming the checklist clients and auditors ask about. Each risk below is part of our test plan.
ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack
We hide instructions in mails, documents and web pages the agent reads, and check whether it drops its task to follow ours.
ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation
We push the agent to use its tools in ways you never intended, such as bulk exports, deletions or payments.
ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse
We check whether the agent acts with more rights than the user who calls it, and whether its tokens can be stolen or reused.
ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain
We review the MCP servers, plugins and third-party tools the agent loads, and test what a malicious one could do.
ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution
We test whether the agent can be made to write and run code or shell commands outside its sandbox.
ASI06 Memory and Context Poisoning
We plant false facts in memory, RAG sources and shared context, and check whether later sessions trust them.
ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
In multi-agent setups we test whether one agent can impersonate or manipulate another.
ASI08 Cascading Failures
We follow one bad output through the chain and show how far the damage spreads.
ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
We test whether the agent can be used to talk an employee into approving something risky.
ASI10 Rogue Agents
We look for agents that keep running, act outside their mandate or lack a working kill switch.
How do we approach AI testing?
Prompt Analysis
We test whether prompts, context manipulation, or hidden instructions can steer the model beyond its intended behaviour, the way a real user or attacker would.
Guardrail Testing
We deliberately bypass the safety rules and restrictions in place, and show exactly where the guardrails fall short and what an attacker gets through.
Agent and MCP permissions
We map what your agents and MCP servers can actually reach, then test scoped keys, tool-call abuse and permission bypasses. We attack the access, not the instructions.
Coding agents and agentic chains
We test the paths where agents act: poisoned allowlisted commands, malicious tool-call chains and leaked secrets. Not just the model's answers, and every finding is validated by hand.
Data Leakage
We check whether sensitive data can leak through model responses, memory or connected integrations, directly or indirectly, and which data an attacker could reach.
Practitioners who use AI themselves
Our ethical hackers build and run their own AI research stack, validated at the Meta Bug Bounty Research Conference 2026 in Taipei. We are active practitioners, not observers.
What does EU AI Act Article 15 require?
High-risk AI systems under Annex III of the EU AI Act must meet cybersecurity requirements. The Digital Omnibus (agreement of 7 May 2026, adopted in July 2026) moved the deadline from 2 August 2026 to 2 December 2027 (stand-alone Annex III) and 2 August 2028 (Annex I, embedded in regulated products). A structured AI pentest is strong evidence for the cybersecurity requirements of Article 15.
What is a high-risk AI system?
Annex III covers AI used for hiring, credit scoring, biometrics, critical infrastructure, and education. If your system falls under it, the cybersecurity requirements of Article 15 apply. A pentest is a common way to substantiate that.
Article 15: what it requires
High-risk AI must resist adversarial attempts to alter its output or behaviour. A structured AI pentest gives you documented proof that it does.
Deadline: 2 December 2027
The Digital Omnibus of 7 May 2026 moved the deadlines to 2 December 2027 (stand-alone Annex III) and 2 August 2028 (AI in regulated Annex I products). Start early to leave room for fixes and retests.
Audit evidence for conformity
Findings are mapped to Article 15, giving your compliance team and conformity assessment body auditable proof that the security obligations are met.
CRA for software and digital products: what should you have tested?
The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) is European regulation for products with digital elements, such as software, apps and smart devices. Since 11 September 2026, manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through the ENISA platform. The remaining obligations apply from 11 December 2027.
A pentest shows whether a vulnerability can really be exploited and what the impact is. That helps you judge faster what to report and fix.
Frequently Asked Questions
Assess your AI security posture
Find out where your AI agents, chatbots and AI-written code are weak, and get a clear list of what to fix first.